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Abstract. The most violent city in the world only twenty years 
ago, Medellín, Colombia is now a beacon of progressive urban 
development.  Governance and structuration theory provide an 
analytical framework through which three stages of this remark-
able transformation can be assessed.  During an illicit hegemo-
ny, narcotraffickers and state military forces ruthlessly controlled 
the city, and clientelism and corruption went unchecked.  The 
principle results of the period were fixity of violence, a destabi-
lization of formal government and a systematic disempower-
ment of the urban poor, who populated the city’s precarious 
mountainsides.  Progressive interventions, inspired by a wave 
of decentralization in the late-1980s, sought to redress grow-
ing informality and enable local agency.  The city’s first resulting 
policy experiment, PRIMED, was short-lived, however, because 
it did not improve municipal administration, strengthen commu-
nity organization or build a political clientele around pro-poor 
governance.  Learning from PRIMED, the current social urban-
ism agenda has ignited a political movement for poverty allevia-
tion and directed spectacular infrastructure investment to the 
city’s poorest regions.  Yet, as social urbanism reaches maturity, 
escalating violence and the city’s competitiveness agenda risk 
derailing its redistributive goals.  Viewing these three periods 
in continuum suggests that while efficiency, agency and equi-
table distribution are critical components and outcomes of good 
governance, the level of interdependence fostered—particularly 
through strong state leadership—profoundly influences both 
the longevity of good governance practice and the durability 
of its impact.  The city’s trajectory, furthermore, offers some 
substantiation of structuration theory.  Local political leader-
ship has built and financed a progressive discourse, which has, 
over time, established new social structures to govern the city’s 
public affairs.  
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1. Introduction: the significance of Medellín, Colombia
With more than half of the world living in cities and ur-
banization intensifying, “the human condition has be-
come the urban condition” (Amin, 2006, 1012).  Yet, as 
Latin American cities demonstrate, the urban environ-
ment is a site of extraordinary contradiction.
Latin America is among the most urbanized regions of the 
world, with 79 percent of its population residing in cities 
(UN-HABITAT, 2010, 12).  Cities generate 60 percent of 
Latin America’s gross domestic product (Cadena, et al., 
2011, 1).  Yet, Latin America is also the “land of inequal-
ity,” where the poorest 30 percent earn only 7.5 percent 
of income (UN-HABITAT, 2008, 67), and more than 110 
million people live in slums (UN-HABITAT, 2010, 32). The 
1980s are referred to as “the lost decade” (Schuurman, 
1993, 191).  Authoritarian governments, economic de-
cline, heavy indebtedness, impervious clientelistic politi-
cal culture and failed economic restructuring produced 
“truly incalculable” ramifications for urban poverty (Har-
ris and Nef, 2008, 87). 
Medellín, Colombia, is in many ways, a microcosm of 
these tensions and transformations.  Colombia was 
enmeshed in a decade-long civil war that affected the 
lives of millions mid-century.  Violence catalyzed exten-
sive migration to industry-rich Medellín, which was un-
prepared for rapid urbanization (Palacios, 2006; Lamb, 
2010).  Millions settled in precarious, mountainside 
slums, and the city’s official response to resulting pov-
erty was neglect or repression (Blanco and Kobayashi, 
2009; PRIMED, 1996).  Once economic decline took 
hold beginning in the 1950s, the city became entangled 
in a logic of unrest and violence linked to a burgeoning 
international drug trade.  By the 1990s, Medellín was the 
deadliest city in the world (Hylton, 2007; Lamb, 2010).
Yet, two decades later, the city is a beacon of urban 
development innovation.  Under the philosophy of “so-
cial urbanism,” successive mayors have mobilized the 
city’s political capital to address extreme poverty and 
inequality (Echeverri, 2008; Devlin, 2010).  Rhetoric has 
been backed by spectacular infrastructural investment, 
cross-sector partnerships and a determined effort to-
ward participatory democracy (Brand and Dávila, 2011; 
Fukuyama and Colby, 2011; Hylton, 2007).  Colombia 
is among the most successful countries in the world for 
reducing slum incidence, having overseen a near-40 
percent reduction since 2000 (UN-HABITAT, 2010, 39-
40).  Nonetheless, new tensions have arisen between 
Medellín’s aspirations for more inclusive public affairs 
and its desire for efficacy, competitiveness and the es-
tablishment of a global model for urban development 
(Brand, 2010).  
This paper seeks to analyze this profound shift in Me-
dellín through the lens of governance and structuration 
theories.  On the one hand governance theory suggests 
that, in an increasingly interconnected world, cities have 
greater capacity to engage a multitude of actors toward 
progressive and effective urban development.  Qualify-
ing that optimism, structuration theory reminds that pro-
gress is, ultimately, a balancing act between the forces 
of structure and human agency.  With this in mind, this 
paper evaluates the extent to which Medellín has in the 
past or now does represent a model of good govern-
ance—one that promotes effectiveness, agency, equita-
ble distribution and interdependence.
This paper is structured in three parts.  To cohere social 
urbanism and its antecedents, Chapter Two introduces 
the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis.  Govern-
ance theory is situated in relation to, first, Anthony Gid-
dens’s duality of structure and agency and, second, the 
nature of the contemporary urban environment.  The 
chapter concludes with an analytical framework, syn-
thesizing how relevant theoretical debates could inform 
a case study.  
Chapter Three employs this analytical framework to study 
governance in Medellín in three periods: first, an era of 
illicit governance defined by violence and narcotraffick-
ing; second, a short-lived experiment in governance in-
novation in informal settlements known as PRIMED (the 
Spanish acronym for a policy entitled “Integral Program 
for Subnormal District Improvement in Medellín”); and 
third, the city’s current urban development philosophy 
known as “social urbanism.”  Though each is presented 
separately, time frames overlap and each period criti-
cally informs those in its future.  For this reason, cor-
responding dates are not assigned to the eras studied.
Finally, Chapter Four presents summary arguments on 
the extent to which Medellín has, over time, met the 
ideals of good governance and the factors that have 
driven or constrained progressive shifts in its balance 
of structure and agency.  The chapter concludes with 
considerations on the prospects for Medellín and social 
urbanism.  
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The research finds that the era of a narcotrafficking 
stronghold, despite its illicit nature, represented a form of 
governance, even though its principle results were fixity 
of violence, a destabilization of formal government and 
the systematic disempowerment of individual choice. 
PRIMED’s holistic interventions, by contrast, sought to 
actively enable agency and channel city resources to-
ward the poor.  The program was short-lived, however, 
because it did not strengthen municipal administration, 
build a political clientele or embed interdependence. 
Learning from PRIMED, social urbanism has success-
fully ignited a political movement around good govern-
ance for poverty alleviation.  Yet, the proliferation of so-
cial urbanism as a model risks prioritizing city marketing 
above the social needs the ideology is envisioned to 
serve.  Viewing the three periods in continuum suggests 
that while efficiency, agency and equitable distribution 
are critical components and outcomes of good govern-
ance, the level of interdependence fostered—through 
state leadership—strongly influences both longevity of 
practice and durability of impact.  
It is worth noting that the research has been constrained 
in three principal respects.  First, social urbanism is cur-
rent and evolving, and urban development research on 
Colombia disproportionately studies the capital, Bogo-
tá.  Consequently, contemporary research on Medellín 
focuses more on policy and process than on outcomes. 
Second, while this work acknowledges Medellín’s in-
herent heterogeneity and its attendant challenges, the 
research does not take an explicitly gendered perspec-
tive.  This is due both to space constraints and the lim-
ited catalogue of gender-based literature on Medellín. 
Finally, the author has translated all Spanish-language 
sources, a limitation to the extent that nuance in local 
speech may have been inadvertently overlooked.
Figure 1.1. Regional maps. Source: Author's elaboration.
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2. Analytical framework: governance, structuration & the city
2.1 Notions of governance
A discursive shift. Over the last fifteen years, a discur-
sive shift has emerged in government and political ad-
ministration: “[t]erms such as ‘governance,’ ‘institutional 
capacity,’ ‘networks,’ ‘complexity,’ ‘trust,’ ‘deliberation’ 
and ‘interdependence’ dominate the debate, while terms 
such as ‘the state,’ ‘government,’ ‘power’ and ‘author-
ity’…have lost their grip on the analytical imagination” 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 1).  Though “social science 
is no less immune to fads than popular culture,” this shift 
in vocabulary is, in fact, “captur[ing] changes in both the 
nature and topography of politics” (ibid.).  
The ascension of this discourse encapsulates a half-
century of changes in economic, political and social or-
ganization.  Simply put, the move from state-centered 
governing paradigms in the 1950s to market-dominated 
interventions in the 1980s placed questions of efficacy 
and responsibility at the center of debates on the man-
agement of public affairs (Jessop, 1998, 3).  Which insti-
tutions would be most effective in responding to public 
needs?  Which institutions were, ultimately, accountable 
for progress?  These questions implied a “gradual shift 
in focus…from input control to outcomes and output 
control,” in the conduct and organization of public affairs 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000, 4). 
Yet, under increasing international (some say global) in-
tegration of government, economics and culture, the 
conventional dualisms of state versus market and private 
versus public appeared incompatible with the range of 
actors, powers and relationships that shaped contem-
porary public life (Jessop, 1998, 3).  Famously, Manuel 
Castells argued for defining cities as spaces of flows and 
societies as systems of networks (1996, 468).  Hajer and 
Wagenaar added that “we can discern shifts in networks: 
new networks eroding the power of previously powerful 
ones.  Moreover, there is the instability of networks: the 
awareness that society experiences a ‘new modernity’ in 
which established institutions might prove less stable and 
solid than we assumed and are less well positioned to 
keep risks at bay” (2003, 5, emph. original).  
Ideals and Opportunities. Though the word “gov-
ernance” was not new, it was adopted in the 1990s to 
account for all manner of phenomena: from a minimal 
state to good governance, corporate governance to new 
public management, and from self-organizing networks 
to socio-cybernetic systems (Rhodes, 1996, 653).  Gov-
ernance was, furthermore, identified at multiple levels of 
interaction: interpersonal, inter-organizational and inter-
systemic (Jessop, 1998, 2).  
For the present purposes, governance is broadly under-
stood as “the process of social and economic coordi-
nation, management and steering” of public affairs, not 
confined to the state apparatus (Painter, 2009, 313).  It 
implies “a movement from the hierarchical, top-down 
exercise of power and rules of state-based systems, to 
more horizontal, networked systems reliant on the inter-
action of independent and inter-dependent actors who 
share a degree of trust” (Dávila, 2009, 41).
The rapid acceptance of the governance lexicon has 
been, in part, politically motivated.  Amid neoliberal an-
tagonism to a hierarchical and bureaucratic state—and 
parallel citizen frustration with state ineffectiveness—the 
dialogue of governance promoted a “new and more con-
temporary image at the same time as it provided some 
degree of support and legitimacy to further cut-backs in 
public expenditures” (Pierre and Peters, 2000, 6).  
Despite these multiple, even dubious, origins, “gover-
nance” has substantial appeal.  It immediately links “the 
political system with its environment…Thinking about 
governance means thinking about how to steer the econ-
omy and society” (Pierre and Peters, 2000, 1).  The term 
“good governance” has been ascribed a variety of mean-
ings, most notoriously associated with neoliberal struc-
tural adjustment programs.  Nonetheless, elements of the 
“good governance” discourse promote cross-sector part-
nerships and citizen participation, which are “viewed as 
empowering, democracy enhancing and more effective 
forms of governing” (Swyngedouw, 2005, 1992, emph. 
added).  Furthermore, broadening responsibility for gov-
erning enlivens a focus on efficiency (Rhodes, 1996, 653, 
emph. added).  The term not only indicates a changed 
understanding of how social activity is coordinated, but 
also predicates a shift in how society thinks about public 
affairs, helping: 
“practitioners and theorists alike to unlearn 
the embedded intellectual reflexes.…There is 
a move from the familiar topography of formal 
political institutions to the edges of organiza-
tional activity, negotiations between sovereign 
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bodies, and inter-organizational networks….
The disparate actors who populate these net-
works find nascent points of solidarity in the 
joint realization that they need one another to 
craft effective political agreements…accept-
able to all who are involved (and to expand the 
circle of involvement)” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 
2003, 3).
Challenges and Considerations. Notwithstanding 
these opportunities, the dynamics of governance raise 
new challenges for public affairs.  Hajer and Wagenaar 
(2003) identify five: 
- New Space of Politics.  First, a governance frame-
work emphasizes “politics that takes place between or-
ganizations,” rather than through the imposition of state 
models (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 8, emph. added). 
In an important critique, Erik Swyngedouw argues that 
governance discourse fabricates “a proliferating maze of 
opaque networks, fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill-de-
fined responsibilities and ambiguous political objectives 
and priorities” (2005, 1999).  Despite differing outlooks, 
both conceptions highlight that moving from a one-actor 
terrain toward more fluid governance raises questions 
of responsibility, authority and accountability.  Jon Pierre 
and Guy Peters have aptly responded that, even with a 
“new space of politics” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 8), 
the state remains a central actor with ultimate responsibil-
ity for “provid[ing] a set of goals for governing” (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000, 31).  
- Politics and Policymaking Under the Condition of 
Radical Uncertainty.  In a postmodern turn, governance 
theory acknowledges that politics and policymaking op-
erate “under the condition of radical uncertainty” (Hajer 
and Wagenaar, 2003, 10).  Government is no longer as-
sumed (nor can contend) to hold “absolute knowledge” 
(ibid.).  In this environment, “concrete problem solving, 
joint responsibility, continuous performance-based and 
collective learning become potential building stones of a 
viable alternative strategy” (ibid.).
- The Increased Importance of ‘Difference’ for our 
Understanding of Politics.  Contemporary, particularly 
urban, societies are extraordinarily heterogeneous.  Ac-
countable to a multitude of groups, institutions of gover-
nance become more responsible for “translation: between 
languages, between discourses, and ultimately between 
people” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 11).  Swyngedouw 
disputes the possibility of translation, arguing that while 
Figure 2.1. Panorama of Medellin. Source: Duque, 2006.
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governance enables participation and reignites state-civil 
society relationships, governance also “redefine[s] and 
reposition[s] the meaning of (political) citizenship and, 
consequently, the nature of democracy itself….New ar-
rangements of governance have created new institutions 
and empowered new actors, while disempowering oth-
ers….leading to a substantial democratic deficit” (2005, 
1991). 
For this reason, Pierre and Peters advocate for a state-
centered model of governance; “[m]arkets may be effi-
cient in allocating resources but…the state remains the 
only creature in society that can play [the] political—and 
democratic—role” (2000, 13).  Thus, “the most important 
thing that governments can do is take all the valid, but 
conflicting and expensive, wants and demands from so-
ciety and convert those into a set of more or less coher-
ent policy statements” (ibid., 31).  In this ambition, shifts 
toward participatory democracy can aid in understanding 
the multitude of public interests (ibid., 45).
- Acting upon an Awareness of Interdependence.  Un-
der governance, problem solving becomes a collabora-
tive task requiring extensive coordination.  Undeniably 
optimistic, interdependence suggests that “the essence 
of dealing with policy conflicts might be a more substan-
tial process of deliberation, shared problem solving and 
developing regimes of joint responsibility than merely in-
terest-based bargaining” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 11). 
- Policymaking and the Dynamics of Trust and Identity. 
Finally, despite increasing interdependence, “trust cannot 
be assumed” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 12).  The com-
plexity of governance arrangements necessitates that 
policymaking be “not simply about finding solutions for 
pressing problems,” but also about “finding formats that 
generate trust among mutually interdependent actors” 
(ibid., emph. original).  Swyngedouw contends this ideal-
ism is unwarranted.  He argues that, rather than promot-
ing trust and identity, the instruments of governance “are 
an integral part of the consolidation of an imposed and 
authoritarian neoliberalism, celebrating the virtues of self-
managed risk, prudence, and self-responsibility” (2005, 
1998).  He adds that:
“network-based forms of governance do not 
(yet) have codified rules and regulations that 
shape or define participation and identify the 
exact domains or arenas of power….While 
such absence of codification potentially per-
mits and elicits socially innovative forms of 
organization and of governing, it also opens 
up a vast terrain of contestation and potential 
conflict that revolves around the exercise of (or 
the capacity to exercise) entitlements and in-
stitutional power” (ibid., 1999).  
Thus, on the one hand, governance is thought to bet-
ter encapsulate the realities of public affairs and enhance 
democracy, effectiveness, and efficiency through collec-
tive action.  On the other hand, governance is seen as 
challenging these very ideals by changing the nature of 
democratic practices and promoting high—some would 
argue unachievable—aspirations of partnership, interde-
pendence and trust.  The role of the state emerges as a 
critical variable in determining the extent to which gover-
nance achieves its promise.
2.2. Structure and agency
Theory of Structuration: Reconciling “Empire-
Building Endeavors”. Social justice theory prizes 
self-determination and self-development—that each in-
dividual should have both the option to choose the life 
she wants to lead as well the capacity to bring that vision 
to fruition (Young, 1990).  Central to this theorization is a 
debate that has generally eluded governance discourse: 
what capacity do ordinary people have to shape their 
environments?  To what extent does the individual have 
efficacy within and against the social, political and eco-
nomic structures implicated in his surroundings?  To what 
extent can governance alter long-standing structures of 
domination?  
In a series of seminal works released in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, Anthony Giddens expounded precisely 
on this balance between “structure” and “agency” in hu-
man society (Giddens, 1976; Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 
1981, Giddens, 1984).  Culminating in a work entitled The 
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Struc-
turation, Giddens argued that social theories had become 
“entrenched” in a misguided division between society 
and the individual (Giddens, 1984, xx).  On the one hand, 
functionalist and structuralist thought, despite other di-
vergences, “tended to express a naturalistic standpoint…
strongly emphasiz[ing] the pre-eminence of the social 
whole over its individual parts (i.e., its constituent actors, 
human subjects)” (ibid., 1).  On the opposing end of the 
spectrum, interpretive sociology, hermeneutics and phe-
nomenology rejected the “tendency…to see human be-
havior as the result of forces that actors neither control 
nor comprehend” (ibid., xvi).  These schools emphasized 
“action and meaning,” and “there [was] not much talk of 
constraint” (ibid., 2).  Giddens found the dichotomy un-
satisfactory in its simplicity:
“If interpretive sociologies are founded, as 
it were, upon an imperialism of the subject, 
functionalism and structuralism propose an 
imperialism of the social object.  One of my 
principal ambitions…is to put an end to each 
of these empire-building endeavors” (ibid., 2).
Giddens promulgated the Theory of Structuration, “based 
on the premise that this dualism” of subject and object—
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of society and individual—as binary opposites “be recon-
ceptualized as a duality” (1984, xx).  By “duality” Giddens 
sought to highlight “the essential recursiveness of social 
life” (1979, 5).  Put more simply, “[w]e should see social 
life not just as ‘society’ out there or just the product of 
‘the individual’ here, but as a series of ongoing activities 
and practices that people carry on, which at the same 
time reproduce larger institutions” (Giddens and Pierson, 
1998, 76).  Under structuration theory, society is not “the 
plastic creation of human subjects” (Giddens, 1984, 30), 
not least because humans cannot determine all the con-
sequences of their actions (Giddens, 1979, 7).  Nonethe-
less, human activity shapes and reshapes—while is itself 
shaped by—the structures in which it takes place (Gid-
dens, 1984). 
Agency: Actors as Knowledgeable Beings. In un-
derstanding the individual, Giddens began from “herme-
neutic starting-point” (1984, 3), deriding that “a good deal 
of social theory…has treated agents as much less knowl-
edgeable than they really are” (ibid., xxx).  Though he 
distinguished between practical consciousness (what in-
dividuals know), discursive consciousness (what individu-
als know and are able to articulate) and the unconscious, 
Giddens explained that actors “monitor continuously the 
flow of their activities….[T]hey also routinely monitor as-
pects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they 
move” (ibid., 5).  Giddens roundly emphasized that “every 
social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of 
reproduction of the society of which he or she is a mem-
ber” (1979, 5). 
Agency, or “the efficacy of human action,” is intimately 
connected to human knowledgeability (Sewell, 1992, 
2).  Referring not to the “intentions people have in doing 
things but their capacity to do those things in the first 
place…[a]gency concerns events of which an individual 
is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, 
at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted 
differently” (Giddens, 1984, 9). Thus, agency implies the 
capacity to “exert some degree of control” over circum-
stances (Sewell, 1992, 20).  In this respect, agency is 
the “basis of power” (Giddens and Pierson, 1998, 84), 
conceived as the “transformational capacity to get things 
done” and “the ability to achieve one’s wishes, even 
against the desires of others” (Tucker, 1998, 82).
For Giddens, both knowledgeability and agency are in-
nate (1984, 3).  However, agency is “formed by a spe-
cific range of cultural [rules] and resources available in a 
person’s particular social milieu.  The specific forms that 
agency will take consequently vary enormously and are 
culturally and historically determined” (Sewell, 1992, 20). 
Furthermore, at any given moment, an agent is positioned 
socially, spatially and temporally within: immediate sur-
roundings and relationships (“co-presence”); varied social 
roles (“time-space distanciation of societal totalities”); the 
flow of day-to-day activities (“daily time-space paths”); an 
individual life history (“life cycle”); and, finally, the life cycle 
of the institutions that frame one’s context (“the longue 
dure é of institutions”) (Giddens, 1984, 84-85).  The in-
fluence an individual’s specific set of agencies can have 
is, therefore, ultimately conditioned upon this time-space 
“positioning” (ibid., 24). 
Structure: Rules, Resources and Domination. 
The other element of Giddens’s duality underlines that 
knowledgeable human agents act within societies that 
are influenced—even governed—by structures.  Giddens 
identifies three types: structures of signification, domina-
tion and legitimation (Figure 2.1) (1984, 30).  Structures 
of signification influence modes of discourse, significance 
and meaning.  Structures of domination impinge upon 
political and economic institutions through the authoriza-
tion and allocation of resources.  Structures of legitima-
tion regulate normative behavior through legal institutions. 
These structures “make it possible for discernibly similar 
social practices to exist across varying spans of time and 
space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form” (ibid., 17).
Structures exist in two types: rules and resources.  Rules 
are “generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/
reproduction of social life” (Giddens, 1984, 21).  They are 
the formal and informal, explicit and implicit laws, practic-
es, norms, symbols and assumptions that guide human 
activity.  Rules allow agents to “know what one is sup-
posed to do in particular situations” (Tucker, 1998, 81). 
An understanding and awareness of rules “is the very 
core of that ‘knowledgeability’ which specifically charac-
terizes human agents,” although “such knowledge does 
not specify all the situations which an actor might meet 
with” (Giddens, 1984, 21). 
Resources are also of two varieties: allocative and au-
thoritative (Giddens, 1984, 33).  Allocative resources are 
those which “generat[e] command over objects, goods 
or material phenomena.  Authoritative resources refer to 
types of transformative capacity generating command 
over persons or actors” (ibid.).  Giddens has faced con-
sistent criticism over his relatively obscure definition of 
authoritative resources; nevertheless, “the gist is clear 
enough: allocation is essentially economic domination, 
authorization politico-ideological” (Callinicos, 1985, 145). 
The interplay of rules and resources determines the 
extent to which structures come to “express forms of 
domination and power” that actually influence human 
activity (Giddens, 1984, 18 and 33).  Sewell explains 
that “[rules] not empowered or regenerated by resourc-
es would eventually be abandoned and forgotten, just 
as resources without cultural [rules] to direct their use 
would eventually dissipate and decay.  Sets of [rules] 
and resources may properly be said to constitute struc-
tures only when they mutually imply and sustain each 
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Figure 2.3. Levels of social organisation. Source: Elaborated by the Author from Giddens, 1979.
other over time” (Sewell, 1992, 12). 
Structuration: Influence through “Virtuality”. For 
Giddens, structures form one of three levels of social 
organization (Figure 2.2).  “Structures,” as discussed, 
include rules and resources.  Further abstracted, “sys-
tems” are sets of recurring social interactions, which are 
informed by structures.  The highest level is “structura-
tion,” or the way in which social systems are produced 
and reproduced over time as a result of changes or con-
stancies in structures (Giddens, 1979, 66).  
The idea of structuration is Giddens’s declarative state-
ment on how agency and structure interact: far from rei-
fied, structures are “both the medium and the outcome of 
the practices which constitute social systems” (1981, 27, 
emph. added).  While 
“[s]tructures shape people’s practices…it is also people’s 
practices that constitute (and reproduce) structures” 
(Sewell, 1992, 4).  Under this duality:
“[S]ociety is a structured phenomenon and…
the structural properties of a group or a soci-
ety have effects upon the way people act, feel 
and think….[But] society only has form and 
that form only has effects on people in so far 
as structure is produced and reproduced in 
what people do” (Giddens and Pierson, 1998, 
77 and 82-83).
“In and through” human activities, “agents reproduce the 
conditions that make [their] activities possible” (Giddens, 
1984, 2, emph. added).  
This worldview is sustained through Giddens’s concep-
tion of structures as “virtual.”  Rules and resources “are 
characterized by the ‘absence of subject’” and exist 
exclusively when invoked through the actions of knowl-
edgeable agents (Giddens, 1979, 66).  “Structure,” Gid-
dens writes, “is out of time and space, save in its instan-
tiations and coordination as memory traces” (1984, 25). 
Put another way, structures “are contingent claims which 
have to be sustained and ‘made to count’ through the ef-
fective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual 
encounters” (ibid., 30, emph. added).  Without exercising 
human agency to reinforce rules or mobilize resources, 
structures would cease to exist.  
Enablement versus Constraint. It is worth restating 
three elements of structuration theory.  First, Giddens de-
fines structures as being “recursively organized.”  Rules 
Structure(s) Theoretical Domain Institutional Order
Signification Theory of coding Symbolic orders / Modes of discourse
Domination Theory of resource authorization
Theory of resource allocation
Political institutions
Economic institutions
Legitimation Theory of normative regulation Legal institutions
Figure 2.2. Types of structures. Source: Elaborated by the Author from Giddens, 1984.
Level Definition
Structure Rules and resources, organized as properties of social systems.  
Structure only exists as “structural properties.”
System Reproduced social relations between actors or collectivities, 
organized as regular social practices
Structuration Conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures, and 
therefore the reproduction of systems
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and resources are neither fixed nor once-built.  Rather, 
their production and reproduction are ongoing.  Sec-
ond, for Giddens, rules and resources are “virtual” and 
exist only once “instantiated” by knowledgeable human 
agents.  By consequence, human agency is at any mo-
ment inherently capable of altering structures and poten-
tially upending forces of domination.  Finally, rules and re-
sources are mutually sustaining.  Agency that alters rules 
cannot be wholly effective in changing structures without 
also impacting the control and dissemination of allocative 
and authoritative resources.  The converse holds as well.
To what extent, however, can structures constrain agen-
cy?  This is a final point on which Giddens has received 
the most fervent criticism.  Giddens acknowledges that 
“the more institutions bite into time and space, the more 
resistant they are to manipulation or change by any indi-
vidual agent” (Giddens, 1984, 170).  Giddens also writes 
that structures are “both enabling and constraining” (Gid-
dens, 1979, 70).  However, he “sedulously avoid[s]” any 
“specification of the stringency of constraints” (Archer, 
1990, 78, emph. added).  By “making [structure and 
agency] mutually constitutive,” structuration theory “pre-
vents examination of their interplay....Structural proper-
ties are integral to social constitution and reconstitution, 
but when do they throw their weight behind one or the 
other?” (ibid., 78 and 83).  Similarly, Giddens offers “no 
discussion of the historically specific conditions that lead 
oppressed groups to resist, and that provide their resis-
tance with sources of organization and power” (Callini-
cos, 1985, 140).
Margaret Archer argues that Giddens’s lack of specificity 
results in a theoretical “hyperactivity of agency,” in which 
actors “generically enjoy very high degrees of freedom” 
(1990, 77).  Though what she and others like Arthur 
Stinchcombe appear to demand is a predictive—rather 
than explanatory—science of society, they raise legiti-
mate questions as to “what sorts of milieux can produce 
what sorts of outputs to structures” (Stinchcombe, 1990, 
56).  Giddens explains that “the conditions of social re-
production vary so widely between different types of soci-
ety” that such specificity at a theoretical level is unreason-
able (1979, 215).  One objective of the present analysis, 
then, is to explore these interactions within the context of 
a particular case.  
Cities are the most dynamic testing ground for the ideals 
of governance and structuration theory, offering contex-
tual complexity to theoretical analysis.  Urban areas are 
now home to 3.3 billion people—more than half of the 
world’s population (UNFPA, 2007, 1).  Indeed, by 2030, 
urbanites are expected to number 5 billion, with urban 
growth continuing at “an unprecedented scale” (ibid.). 
This population growth has yielded complex and con-
tradictory cities—capital and power rich and increasingly 
heterogeneous, yet notorious for inequality and informal-
ity (Amin, 2006; Mayer 2007; Robinson 2006; Sander-
cock, 1998; Soja and Kanai, 2007). 
Though cities have had economic prominence since at 
least the Industrial Revolution, capital has become in-
creasingly concentrated in cities as a result of a new wave 
of economic integration (Soja and Kanai, 2007).  Cities 
are increasingly seen as command centers for global 
flows of capital, culture and labor, particularly under new 
“flexible” economic models that allow for integrated, yet 
transnational production and distribution (Sassen, 1991; 
Soja and Kanai, 2007).  Furthermore, this economic focus 
on cities has coincided with their political transformation 
(Brenner, 2004).  The diversification and decentralization 
of state powers to multiple levels of government has cre-
ated “new state spaces” (ibid.) in which municipal gover-
nance can, theoretically, more efficiently allocate resourc-
es and “ensure the public sector responds to the needs 
and aspirations” of its constituencies (Alam, 2006, 2). 
A less optimistic view of these shifts raises concerns 
over the capacities and interests of municipal administra-
tions.  Local government “now performs new tasks that 
are more technically complex and politically sensitive than 
the tasks they performed before” (Alam, 2006, 4), exacer-
bating the “emergent, contingent, contested, and poten-
tially unstable outcomes” of local administration (Brenner, 
2004, 85).  A case in point is economic steering, which 
increasingly tests cities’ abilities to respond to local de-
mands while pursuing international economic competi-
tiveness.  Municipal administrations have been criticized 
for “place-marketing…and new forms of local booster-
ism,” which can ignore local imperatives or impede local 
decision-making (Mayer, 2007, 91; Safier, 2002).
The urban environment is also characterized by extraor-
dinary heterogeneity.  Heightened by internal and inter-
national migration, this diversity is not only evident in the 
people who compose the city—varied by age, class, 
ethnicity, gender, religion, ability and sexuality—but also 
their interests and interactions (Sandercock, 1998, 165). 
Heterogeneity has made more pronounced “the chal-
lenges of negotiating…multiplicity and difference” (Amin, 
2006, 1012).  Changing social, economic and demo-
graphic structures “can call into question longstanding 
notions of citizenship and national identity” (Sandercock, 
1998, 165).  The idea of a “public interest” also becomes 
contested as municipal administrations are tasked with 
understanding diverse “ways of being” and “ways of 
knowing,” and building what Leonie Sandercock calls “an 
epistemology of multiplicity” (ibid., 181). 
Finally, in stark contrast to their embedded wealth and 
power, many of the world’s cities are also characterized 
by pronounced inequality and informality (Harris and Nef, 
2.3. Implications for the city
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2008, 13).  In Latin America, “exploitative relations of cap-
italist production and distribution, the hierarchical struc-
tures of power and forms of coercion, and the networks 
of political and social influence” have produced among 
the most unequal cities in the world (ibid., 4).  Though:
“some degree of geographically uneven de-
velopment has always been present in the hu-
man occupation of the earth…the global dis-
tribution of wealth and power today is almost 
surely more polarized (and unjust) than ever 
before, with growing numbers of the super-
rich concentrated in a few favored spaces and 
places while a billion or more people live, often 
strikingly adjacent, in increasingly compacted 
slums” (Soja, 2010, 57; Davis, 2006; Soja and 
Kanai, 2007).  
Indeed, while informality is not synonymous with pover-
ty, informal settlements are linked to economic insecu-
rity, precarious housing, disease, malnutrition, drugs and 
violence (UN-HABITAT, 2003, vi).  In fact, 80 percent of 
urban expansion in the Amazon, one of the world’s fast-
est growing regions, has occurred in informal settlements 
(Davis, 2006, 17). 
The urban environment, thus, is defined by tensions: on 
the one hand, “[d]ense and heterogeneous cities and 
city regions have become the driving forces of the global 
economy, generating enormous wealth as well as tech-
nological innovation and cultural creativity….But at the 
same time, urban agglomerations can also function to in-
tensify inequalities and social polarization” (Soja and Ka-
nai, 2007, 68).  While, “the myriad bolt-holes that are to 
be found in cities provide some possibility to the millions 
of dispossessed, dislocated and illegal people stripped of 
citizenship to acquire some political capital” (Amin, 2006, 
1012), “too often, the reality of local, empowering institu-
tions and programs fails to match the rhetoric” (Kearns 
and Paddison, 2000, 849).  
The city highlights critical questions for governance and 
structuration theory.  How effective can governance be in 
sites of diversity and heterogeneity?  How well can gov-
ernance balance structure and agency—and distribute 
capital and power—to counter extreme urban poverty 
and inequality?  How well can the ideals of governance 
foster interdependence among the multitude of actors in 
the urban environment? 
2.4. Analytical Framework
Synthesis of Theoretical Arguments. Given in-
creasing international connectedness, cities have been 
conceived of as spaces of flows and societies as systems 
of networks.  Concomitant with these changes to the or-
ganization of human activity, a notion of “governance” has 
emerged.  Responsibility for organizing and coordinating 
public affairs is being devolved to a range of actors and 
sectors.  Governance theory promotes a vision of soci-
ety that is heterogeneous and uncertain, but effectively 
shaped by collaborative problem solving among actors 
of mutual trust.
While social structures can influence, constrain or domi-
nate action, knowledgeable human agents also shape 
the structures that surround them.  Composed of rules 
and resources, structures are “virtual” and exist only as 
agents invoke, produce and reproduce them.  Though 
agencies vary by individual and across time and space, a 
capacity for agency is innate and implies that human ac-
tions can, indeed, be mobilized toward structural change 
in the city.  The notion of a duality of structure is entirely 
compatible with the optimism of good urban governance. 
balance structure and agency—and distribute capital and 
power—to counter extreme urban poverty and inequal-
ity?  How well can the ideals of governance foster inter-
dependence among the multitude of actors in the urban 
environment? 
Indicators of Analysis. Bringing together governance, 
structuration and the urban context, four analytical criteria 
emerge to assess the quality of urban governance:
- Distributing Rules and Resources.  Virtual rules and 
resources are retained and controlled by human beings 
and given power through action (Giddens, 1984).  Thus, 
the control and mobilization of a city’s rules and resources 
impinges directly upon whether structures are maintained 
or reconceived (ibid.).  What is to be evaluated are the im-
pacts of governance—whether agents in contemporary 
cities are granted equitable control over the production 
and reproduction of rules, and the mobilization and dis-
tribution of the city’s wealth in authoritative and alloca-
tive resources.  Of critical importance is that rules and 
resources be mutually enforced for systemic change. 
- Achieving Effectiveness.  While acknowledging that 
policymaking occurs “under the condition of radical un-
certainty” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, 10), “efficiency 
and effectiveness in the use of resources still matter” (Ke-
arns and Paddison, 2000, 848).  Indeed, among the core 
precepts of governance is that a broader engagement 
of actors can result in a more effective management of 
urban affairs—that intended outcomes can be achieved 
efficiently and responsibly (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; 
Jessop, 1998, Pierre and Peters, 2000; Swyngedouw, 
2005).  The objective of the present analysis is to test 
the extent to which these claims are reflected in practice 
or whether governance is pursued more as a means to 
devolve responsibility.
- Enabling Agency.  Though agency is innate, it is also 
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conditioned by individual life experiences and social struc-
tures (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).  As such, to enable 
agency, particularly in heterogeneous and unequal cities, 
requires improving individuals’ capacities and opportuni-
ties to act, and to act with influence.  The goal is not to 
guarantee predetermined outcomes in favor of the urban 
poor.  Rather, in light of Giddens’s duality of structure, the 
objective is to evaluate the extent to which governance 
practices progressively shift the balance of structure and 
agency in favor of local capacity and decision-making au-
thority.  Without enabled agency, structures of significa-
tion, dominance and legitimation persist unchallenged.
- Embedding Interdependence.  Finally, governance in 
a networked society is believed to foster collaboration, 
trust, joint responsibility and collective decision-making 
by the heterogeneous actors in the city (Hajer and Wage-
naar, 2003).  The inclusion of more actors in governance, 
furthermore, can be seen as a means of enhancing the 
proximity and representativeness of institutions to their 
constituents.  What is of interest is not only whether these 
utopian ideals are manifest in the praxis of governance, 
but also whether they become embedded so as to set 
precedents for future collaborative action toward the 
same progressive ends. 
In the following chapter, these four analytical criteria are 
employed to assess the success of governance in ame-
liorating conditions of urban poverty over three periods, 
constituting a half-century in the history of Medellín. 
3.1. Historical development
City origins. Medellín is the “most conservative city in 
Colombia, the continent’s most conservative country” 
(Hylton, 2007, 71), and yet, over the last two decades, 
Medellín has produced among the most progressive ur-
ban development innovations.
Medellín is the capital of Antioquia, a northern province 
home to 12 percent of the Colombian population and 
source of nearly 15 percent of gross domestic product. 
With 3.5 million people, the Metropolitan Area of Medellín 
is Colombia’s second largest and has rapidly urbanized 
over the last sixty years, becoming a political, economic 
and cultural hub (Blanco and Kobayashi, 2009, 81).  The 
Metropolitan Area of Medellín is composed of ten mu-
nicipalities, of which the municipality of Medellín is larg-
est and wealthiest.  The municipality of Medellín is further 
composed of 16 districts (comunas), which are clustered 
to the east and west of the Medellín River within the Abur-
rá Valley.
Colombia’s mountainous topography has created geo-
graphical divides, its diverse population has created so-
cial divides, and its unequal capitalist development has 
created socio-economic divides, which have proven im-
mensely challenging to govern centrally (Palacios, 2006, 
xiii and 265).  As a result, Colombia has operated as a 
patchwork of cities and city-networks, and Medellín has 
historically operated with a measure of independence 
(ibid., 226; Lamb, 2010, 175).  
Medellín was founded as a commercial center and gold-
mining town in 1675.  The city became the economic 
capital of the region by the late-1700s, and in the late-
1800s induced the first Colombian industrialization on the 
profits of thriving coffee exports.  Economic opportunities 
in Medellín formalized still-present links between the city 
and its rural surroundings, as the city became a destina-
tion for migrant laborers in manufacturing and industry 
(Hylton, 2007; Palacios, 2006).  
Early prominence and state weakness also engendered a 
distinct local entrepreneurialism; in contrast to many Latin 
American cities, Medellín’s growth was not due to North 
American investment, but rather to “native” business (Hyl-
ton, 2007, 73).  In tandem with the Catholic Church, Me-
dellín’s economic sector developed a culture that prized 
discipline, work ethic, hierarchy and authority (Melguizo 
3. Case study: governance progression in Medellín
and Cronshaw, 2001, 113; Lamb, 2010, 36 and 296). 
In the 1940s, Colombia was entrenched in a decade of 
civil war, known as La Violencia.  Medellín emerged physi-
cally unscathed, yet violence in the countryside acceler-
ated migration to the city and rapid urbanization (Lamb, 
2010).  At the same time, local elitism—which fomented 
clientelism in both business and politics—viewed urban 
poverty as an invariable corollary to industrialization.  In 
1947, Life magazine dubbed Medellín a “capitalist para-
dise” (Hylton, 2007, 75).
Violent submersion. By the late 1950s, however, 
Medellín’s prosperity was declining.  Coffee prices were 
falling, and burgeoning Asian manufacturing reduced de-
mands for local exports (Hylton, 2007, 76; Lamb, 2010, 
37).  Nonetheless, migration to the city continued at a 
“dizzying pace” (Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, 114). 
Medellín’s population grew from 350,000 to 1.5 million be-
tween 1951 and 1985 (Figure 3.1) (Fukuyama and Colby, 
2011).  With housing and employment shortfalls, millions 
settled in the physically and socially precarious mountain-
sides, where the state was noticeably absent (Figure 3.2) 
(Lamb, 2010, 82).  Low school retention brought high 
youth inactivity and unemployment (PRIMED, 1996, 36). 
A “marginal citizenry” became embedded into a “sharply 
segregated and exclusionary” urban fabric (Melguizo and 
Cronshaw, 2001, 114).  By 1972, 50 percent of the pop-
ulation—600,000 people—lived in informal settlements 
(PRIMED, 1996, 29).
 
The economic decline and rise in inequality coincided 
with the formation of the Medellín cartel.  Locals, includ-
ing Pablo Escobar, understood that “smuggling cheap 
goods—clothing, cigarettes—from the duty-free zone of 
Panama to beat high import tariffs would prove a lucrative 
alternative to domestic production and an effective means 
of money laundering” (Hylton, 2007, 78).  Smuggling 
eventually provided avenues for international distribution 
of cocaine processed in Colombia.  Growing frustrations 
with the government’s inability to address poverty incited 
social unrest and a “dynamic that confer[red] legitimacy 
on revolutionary projects and violent alternatives” (Barón 
and Mond, 2001, 13; Lamb, 2010, 207).  In general, “the 
1980s saw an escalation in armed conflict at the national 
level; with the emergence of paramilitary groups, self-de-
fense groups, militia organizations, and others of their ilk, 
the boundaries between political, social, and criminal mo-
tives blurred” (Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, 114-115). 
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The consolidation of illicit economies provided a battle-
ground for local power.  Violence escalated precipitously, 
and in 1991, Medellín was the most violent city in the 
world (Figure 3.3) (Echeverri, 2008).  In December 1992 
alone, the city reported 647 murders, an average of more 
than 20 homicides each day (Lamb, 2010, 118).  By 1989, 
45,000 youths had been assassinated, and the following 
decade would bring the death of 55,000 more (Carva-
jal, 2011, 2-5; Hylton, 2007, 72). Indeed, “the logics of 
narcotrafficking and the associated violence became em-
bedded in the local economy, social and political prac-
tices;” “indices of corruption and clientelism became el-
evated…and levels of poverty worsened” (Carvajal, 2011, 
2-5; Avilés, 2006).  In 1994, while other Colombian cities 
grew, employment fell in Medellín by 1.5 percent and un-
employment jumped from 12.4 to 14 percent (PRIMED, 
1996, 36).  Though urban planning had been institutional-
ized in 1899 (Hylton, 2007, 73), the state was ill-equipped 
to confront the multitude or gravity of development chal-
lenges (PRIMED, 1996, 21).  
Contemporary Transformations. Neoliberal eco-
nomic policies instituted in response to these alarming 
realities “fail[ed]…to address endemic poverty, massive 
inequality, rising informality in the business sector, and 
violent conflict” (Bateman, et al., 2011, 1).  The informal 
sector provided an increasing share of jobs in Medellín—
rising from 50.2 percent in 1984, to 51.8 percent in 1992, 
and 55.7 percent in 2000 (Betancur, 2007, 1).  
Amid the country’s downward spiral, however, seeds of 
transformation were planted as decentralization policies 
emerged internationally.  Though narcotraffickers would 
maintain a stronghold on Medellín until a peace agree-
ment was forged in the mid-2000s, governance decen-
tralization offered both vertical and horizontal shifts of 
power—strengthening local governments and incorpo-
rating non-state actors (Dávila, 2011).  In the late-1980s, 
Colombia began to institutionalize citizen participation 
and strengthen local democracy as a formal response to 
violence and disenfranchisement (Calderon, 2008; Car-
vajal, 2011; Dávila, 2009).  
Mayors mobilized their newfound prominence and power 
by “enacting bold fiscal and institutional reforms, help-
ing to reduce crime and violence, fostering tolerance and 
the creation of a ‘citizen culture,’ and launching major ur-
ban programs that helped coalesce major shifts in their 
cities’ trajectories” (Dávila, 2009, 38).  Medellín mayors 
(and their peers in Bogotá) have begun “a new genera-
tion of municipal programs seeking to physically upgrade 
existing [informal] settlements and to integrate them both 
physically and socially into the fabric of the city” (Brand 
and Dávila, 2011, 2).  High-profile, holistic interventions 
executed through cross-sector collaboration and partici-
patory methods have given Medellín a “makeover” (Hyl-
ton, 2007).  The city increasingly “embodies an impres-
sive combination of imagination and boldness” (Brand 
and Dávila, 2011, 2).
Why Medellín? Medellín brings together the many con-
tending forces of the contemporary city—migration, het-
erogeneity, informality, public administration, international 
economic integration and illicit activity, to name but a few. 
From its origins as an economic nerve center within an 
unmanageable national territory; to its status as the dead-
liest city in the world, governed by narcotrafficking; to its 
noteworthy resurgence as a progressive force for urban 
development, Medellín exemplifies Neil Brenner’s argu-
ment that local actors critically shape contemporary po-
litical, social and economic development (2004).  Medellín 
is increasingly recognized around the world as a model of 
“highly competent city management” (Dávila, 2009, 39), 
and this not in spite of its violent past.  
To what extent is Medellín’s transformation exemplar of 
“governance”?  What has been its trajectory, and what 
have been its merits?  How has governance in Medellín, 
in its various forms since the 1950s, addressed the priori-
ties of achieving efficiency, enabling agency, distributing 
rules and resources, and embedding interdependence?   
3.2. Period one: illicit governance (Vio-
lence and Narcotrafficking)
Research on contemporary Medellín tends to view the 
city’s current political climate as having overcome a pe-
riod of lawlessness—a period without governance.  Quite 
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Figure 3.1. Population growth (Medellín Metro Area). 
Sources: PRIMED, 1996; MedellínInfo, 2000.
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Occupation to 1985
Occupation 1985-1998
the contrary, the illicit stronghold over Medellín represents 
a distinct form of governance.  The complex interac-
tions between the state, communities, narcotraffickers, 
paramilitaries, guerrillas, local gangs and state armed 
forces were, indeed, a “process of social and economic 
coordination, management and steering” (Painter, 2009, 
313), even if the primary achievement of that governance 
has been a “murderous downward spiral” (Hylton, 2007, 
78) of violence and conflict (Ferreyra and Segura, 2000; 
Lamb, 2010; Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001).  
The rise of an illicit governance structure in Medellín can 
be attributed to several factors, principal among them: 
economic downturn beginning in the 1950s; the city’s in-
ability to cope with mass in-migration following La Violen-
cia; the economic opportunity of the drug trade; and the 
historic weakness of the Colombian central government 
(Fukuyama and Colby, 2011; Hylton, 2007; Lamb, 2010; 
Palacios, 2006, PRIMED, 1996).  By the 1980s, Medellín 
had also adopted neoliberal economic paradigms to bol-
ster a powerful and independent private sector.  The city’s 
capitalistic patterns became further ingrained, with fami-
lies increasingly dependent on employers for support and 
politicians willing to provide services through clientelism 
and corruption (Hylton, 2007).  These policies exacer-
bated urban poverty and did little to quell violent reactions 
(Bateman, et al., 2011; Avilés, 2006; Harris and Nef, 2008). 
Responding to growing economic insecurity, local gangs 
and left-wing guerilla forces multiplied the already violent 
presence of narcotraffickers (Melguizo and Cronshaw, 
2001).  The national government “operated only a small 
army and national police.  Members of the country’s tra-
ditional elite liked things this way, preferring to protect 
themselves by arming local paramilitaries.  Over time, the 
paramilitaries grew in size, power and independence” 
(Fukuyama and Colby, 2011).  Violence became main-
stream, and the state lacked resources to respond.  A 
governance structure had been inadvertently established 
through the complex interactions of the wealthy and poor, 
the formal and informal, and the violent and otherwise 
illicit—interactions framed by conflicting economic, politi-
cal and social objectives.
Distributing Rules and Resources. Under this sys-
tem of governance, capitalist structures “remained sub-
ject to a family monopoly, and manufacturing never devel-
oped from light consumer goods into heavy goods and 
machinery” (Hylton, 2007, 76).  Imperviousness in eco-
nomic organization heavily restricted “any trickle-down 
wealth effect” (ibid.).  Neoliberal economic restructuring 
Figure 3.2. Urban expansion (1985-1998). Source: Dávila, 2011.
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prompted declines in the agrarian economy and manu-
facturing, while further entrenching inequality (Ahumada 
and Andrews, 1998; Avilés, 2006).  Indeed, by the late-
1990s, 0.3 percent of holdings controlled 60 percent of 
productive land; 10 percent of the population held 58 per-
cent of national income; and unemployment reached 20 
percent, with devastating consequences, particularly for 
poor urban youth (Avilés, 2006, 391; Hylton, 2007, 77). 
The city’s response vacillated between ignoring or actively 
repressing informality and poverty (PRIMED, 1996).  
Yet, outside the formal economy, Medellinenses found 
support through illicit resources.  Pablo Escobar and the 
Medellín cartel employed “the plata [that] came from the 
drug trade—hundreds of millions of dollars per month 
by the mid-1980s” to bribe city officials, while also fund-
ing social programs, building soccer fields, churches, 
schools and “even entire barrios where poor people living 
in shacks could be relocated into brick houses with elec-
tricity and running water” (Lamb, 2010, 51).  In exchange, 
Escobar was able to recruit “small street gangs…on an 
ad hoc basis to carry out select assassinations and other 
acts of violence” from those areas that had been tacitly 
ignored or actively repressed by the state (ibid.).  Local 
militias opposing narcotraffickers followed suit; “their ac-
tivities included improvement projects such as clean-up, 
paving, painting, sports and recreation, as well as night 
patrols and the resolution of domestic and neighborly dis-
putes” (Hylton, 2007, 81; Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001). 
These were the perverse positives of illicit governance: 
despite propagating violence and disorder, for some, the 
system provided “the means—money, identity, respect—
to escape” poverty (Lamb, 2010, 46).  By consequence, 
the rules of violence and drug trafficking offered viable, 
even legitimate livelihoods, “a model of upward mobility 
for broad sectors of the population” (Melguizo and Cron-
shaw, 2001, 118-119).  The price paid would be “thou-
sands of corpses,” “the lure of easy money,” and “a bro-
ken system of authority relations, in which neither one’s 
family, nor one’s community, nor one’s church, nor one’s 
government had the credibility needed to enforce norms 
of behavior that could enable peaceful coexistence and 
maintain social, familial, or personal stability” (Lamb, 
2010, 71). 
Achieving Effectiveness. For the ruling drug class—
perhaps also for elements of the political elite—this form 
of governance was effective, as it conferred short-term 
command over local capital and power.  Narcotraffickers 
and state military forces were ruthless in maintaining their 
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domination, while the political class partly secured liveli-
hoods through corrupt allegiances to those forces (Avilés, 
2006; Hylton, 2007; Lamb, 2010).
Yet, from a longer-term perspective, the governance 
structure produced a highly ineffective “negative stale-
mate” in which neither the state nor the armed factions 
could triumph (Barón and Mond, 2001, 26).  Neoliberal 
restructuring aimed to produce a “low-intensity democ-
racy;” in which the state took a secondary role in all mat-
ters, including security (Avilés, 2006, 383).  Through its 
retrenchment, the state would, theoretically, allow for po-
litical opposition, individual freedom and a more attractive 
environment for foreign investment.  However, neoliberal 
reforms failed to integrate swaths of the urban popula-
tion and promoted a privatization of violence, whereby 
responsibility for repressing internal conflict was “in large 
part shifted to private groups of armed civilians” (ibid., 
381-382).  The Colombian state had “neither the power 
nor the authority to settle social conflicts or enforce the 
law,” resorting instead to “deals, compromises, and con-
frontations” (Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, 112).  The 
local government, in turn, was a “weak agent…bargain-
ing as if it were on the same level as other armed groups. 
It never appear[ed] as the legitimate locus of power with 
the right to impose its will” (ibid., 127).  A cyclical pattern 
emerged in which violence and clientelism exacerbated 
the weakness of public institutions, and in turn, permit-
ted further violence (Ferreyra and Segura, 2000; PRIMED, 
1996).
The ordinary residents of Medellín, ultimately, suffered. 
Upheaval over the city’s command functions effectively 
deteriorated the urban fabric, degraded the livelihoods 
of the urban poor, and forestalled political and economic 
progress.  Even once migration stemmed in the 1980s, 
neither governance nor social integration improved (Mel-
guizo and Cronshaw, 2001, 114). 
Enabling Agency. Agency enabled during the period 
was not the intent, but rather a byproduct, of illicit gover-
nance.  Though mismanagement had dismantled the le-
gitimacy of the political system and fed political alienation 
(Nickson, 1995, 146), economic and security challenges 
fueled social organization (Carvajal, 2011).  Over 200 civic 
strikes took place in Colombia between 1970 and 1986 
(Nickson, 1995, 146), and “a broader urban left was be-
coming visible, as worker, student and guerrilla networks 
began to converge” (Hylton, 2007, 77).  Though their pro-
tests—in some cases, kidnapping and extortion—were 
met with “savage repression by state forces” (ibid.), these 
actions represented a (violent) civic engagement that 
sought to challenge the governance structures in place. 
Despite their history of political struggle, many civic or-
ganizations founded during this period are now viewed 
not as representatives of social dissatisfaction but as 
“part extremist…masquerading as a political movement” 
(Lamb, 2010, 213).  Furthermore, beyond civic organi-
zation, agency was limited or severely constrained.  The 
Colombian population failed to grow influential voices of 
opposition to narcotrafficking hegemony: 
 
“The 15,000-20,000 guerrillas, the 5,000 
paramilitaries, the rogue elements within the 
state security agencies, and the organized 
criminal groups…do not represent the 37 mil-
lion Colombians.  But the 37 million Colom-
bians have never given a clear voice to a re-
jection of extrajudicial state violence and the 
systematic impunity of its perpetrators or of 
the protagonists of the conflict and their meth-
ods” (Barón and Mond, 2001, 15-16).
In an environment defined by violence, “citizens act sim-
ply out of self-preservation or the survival instinct.  Unable 
to count on the legally constituted state or its system of 
justice…they turn to the armed group that offers the most 
favorable alternative or perhaps simply have to submit 
to whichever group has taken over the zone” (Melguizo 
and Cronshaw, 2001, 112).  Elites who advocated for a 
low-intensity democracy also “allowed or promoted state 
and para-state repression as a necessary complement 
to economic and political change” (Avilés, 2006, 392). 
Though Medellinenses possessed innate agency, their 
ability to express it was immobilized or, at best, strongly 
influenced by structures of violence.
Embedding Interdependence. Interdependence in a 
society marked by such tensions is undoubtedly an illu-
sory ideal.  Within the ruling classes, “interdependence” 
was manifest in mercurial allegiances, lasting only as long 
as expedient.  Ruling families “reproduc[ed] modes of 
domination characteristic of domestic servitude,” and so-
cial relations “emphasiz[ed] ‘absolute personal loyalty and 
obedience’ to help shape a working-class ethos of vertical 
ties to patrones and prompt, efficient execution of orders” 
(Hylton, 2007, 74).  Even within the maze of narcotraffick-
ing, an alliance of convenience, including state forces and 
Escobar’s former associates, would turn against Escobar 
and see to his being jailed in 1991 and then killed in 1993. 
The network formed for his defeat would then establish “a 
new order” under Diego Fernando Murillo, or Don Berna, 
and his criminal allies, La Terraza (ibid., 83-85).  
Early attempts at militia demobilization also failed be-
cause of distrust and poor collaboration (Melguizo and 
Cronshaw, 2001; Lamb, 2010; Rozema, 2008).  Under 
various names—“peace camps,” “Coosercom,” “Con-
vivir”—successive administrations spent over a decade 
testing methods to reintegrate violent agents.  Yet, indi-
viduals linked to paramilitaries were placed on govern-
ment commissions, demobilization was poorly financed, 
demobilized agents were killed by residual forces, and ru-
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mors spread that even then-President Ernesto Samper’s 
election campaign had been funded, in part, by narcodol-
lars (Lamb, 2010, 209).  
Demobilization would not be marginally successful until 
2002, when it was conceptualized through a collective 
ideal: that “peace is good business” (Barón and Mond, 
2001, 14).  Murillo took credit for the shift, stating that he 
understood the “need to create the ‘necessary climate so 
that investment returns, particularly foreign investment, 
which is fundamental if we do not want to be left behind 
by the engine of globalization’” (Hylton, 2007, 86).  The 
irony is that, despite Murillo’s hand in the disintegration 
of Medellín, arguing in favor of a collective ideal earned 
him momentary legitimacy through a “fusion of politics, 
property and organized crime” (ibid., 85).
Alan Gilbert raised a critical question emerging from this 
period: 
“[T]he main need throughout Latin America is 
for better urban leadership....[I]t is difficult to 
know how it can possibly emerge under current 
circumstances.  Without more resources and a 
change in the political economic system, how 
can urban leadership be strong without being 
autocratic, how can local democracy emerge 
when even elected governments repress com-
munity autonomy?” (1992, 228).
3.3. Period Two: Governance Experimenta-
tion (PRIMED)
Like much of Latin America, Colombia began decentraliz-
ing state authority to municipal governments and citizens 
in the 1990s (Nickson, 1995; Nickson, 2010).  Mayors 
were first elected by popular vote in 1989 (Lamb, 2010, 
127); the 1989 National Urban Land Reform mandated 
that urban policies “address the integration of subnormal 
[informal] settlements” (Calderon, 2008, 56); a new na-
tional constitution was ratified in 1991, “defining partici-
pation as a constitutive principle and function of the Co-
lombian State” (Carvajal, 2011, 2-5) and increasing local 
governments transfers to 41 percent of national revenue 
by 2001 (Betancur, 2007; Nickson, 2010) 1; and the 1997 
Law of the Territorial Order mandated that municipal ad-
ministrations create local development plans (Calderon, 
2008, 58).
Thus, in the midst of continuing violence (Hylton, 2007), 
impervious clientelism (Ferreyra and Segura, 2000), 
growing informality (PRIMED, 1996), and the “inglorious 
end” to neoliberal economic policies (Bateman, et al., 
2011, 1), the municipal state was being granted greater 
responsibility to address local crises through participatory 
methods.  In particular, the precarious conditions associ-
ated with informal housing were of growing concern; 80 
percent of new settlement in Medellín over the previous 
20 years had been informal (PRIMED, 1996, 37).  These 
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Figure 3.4. PRIMED intervention zones. Source: PRIMED, 1996.
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urban realities and political transformations inspired the 
Integral Program for Subnormal District Improvement in 
Medellín (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios 
Subnormales en Medellín, or PRIMED).  PRIMED sought 
the “bettering of life quality of the population of subnor-
mal districts in the city” and “the unification of the city 
and the improvement of district cohabitation” (PRIMED, 
1996, 59).  Holistic interventions were to be the means of 
urban reconstitution in the poorest areas of the municipal-
ity of Medellín—including narcotrafficking and paramilitary 
strongholds (Betancur, 2007; PRIMED, 1996).  
PRIMED had six objectives: strengthen planning, man-
agement and inter-institutional collaboration; promote 
community participation and state-civil society partner-
ships; improve basic infrastructure, public services and 
public spaces; upgrade informal housing; secure land 
tenure for informal settlements; and mitigate geological 
risks on the mountainsides (PRIMED, 1996, 59; Betan-
cur, 2007, 4).  Though estimates vary, the program as-
pired to reach 140,000 to 200,000 people living in 30 to 
70 informal settlements (Calderon 2008, 56; Blanco and 
Kobayashi, 2009, 80).  The first of two phases was to 
run from 1992 to 1997 and would target three informal 
districts, which were most amenable to immediate inter-
vention (Figure 3.4).  The second phase would begin after 
an evaluation of the first and would target the remain-
ing five informal districts (Consejería Presidencial Para 
Medellín, 1993, 14).  PRIMED’s US$31 million cost was 
funded predominantly by KfW, a German development 
bank (31.3 percent) and national sources (68.5 percent), 
including housing subsidies, municipal funds and com-
munity contributions in cash or in kind (ibid.). 
Distributing Rules and Resources. Undoubtedly 
its greatest success, PRIMED’s underlying objective was 
that “residents of subnormal zones stop to be ignored 
(sic)” (PRIMED, 1996, 119) and that the city invest in local 
priorities (Betancur, 2007, 4).  This represented a radical 
shift in rules for a municipality that previously relied on “re-
pressive measures against people illegally occupying any 
space” (PRIMED, 1996, 30), including “slum clearance, 
isolated paternalistic interventions…and political clien-
telism or negligence” (Betancur, 2007, 2).  Furthermore, 
Medellín indicated a desire to offer “flexible treatment” 
to informal lifestyles, accepting that they may “interfere 
with certain formal standards” and regulations (PRIMED, 
1996, 50).  
Though no independent evaluation was conducted, 
PRIMED staff estimated the program benefited 51,000 
people, only 25-30 percent of the target but approximate-
ly 20 percent of the population in informal settlements in 
the municipality of Medellín (Consejería Presidencial Para 
Medellín, 1993, 14; PRIMED, 1996, 12; Betancur, 2007, 
2).  Pedestrian infrastructure cover rose from 40 to 60 
percent (compared with an average of 90 percent in the 
rest of the city).  Approximately 2,800 square meters of 
public spaces were developed, and water and sewer 
systems were extended to 90-95 percent of households. 
More than 3,500 dwellings were improved (Betancur, 
2007, 6).  PRIMED also offered funding for “collective ini-
tiative projects” identified by communities, thus margin-
ally shifting control of public resources to communities 
(PRIMED, 1996, 117) 2.  Though PRIMED also hoped 
to achieve land tenure regularization, existing legislation 
and landlords constrained its efforts (Betancur, 2007, 10). 
Approximately 2,100 households received legal tenure, 
falling short of a targeted 5,180 (ibid.).
Though these achievements are no small feat, particularly 
in Medellín, PRIMED failed to gain a political constituency 
(see Interdependence), and the program was terminated 
before beginning its second phase.  The five informal 
zones most in need of intervention were left without the 
city’s support (Consejería Presidencial Para Medellín, 1993, 
14).  Furthermore, PRIMED’s underlying approach to rule 
and resource distribution was disconcertingly two-sided. 
Rhetorically, PRIMED sought to better integrate informal 
settlements into the urban fabric.  Yet, the municipality also 
argued that PRIMED would “lead to densification, and con-
sequently, a better use of urban land, diminishing demand 
pressures for new housing in the last available lands in the 
city” (ibid., 15).  Similarly, the municipality was motivated to 
PRIMED because “[a]ll the important cities of the world are 
getting ready to be acquainted with the global economy…
and Medellín city cannot be the exception” (Sergio Nara-
njo, quoted in PRIMED, 1996, 11).  PRIMED was implicitly 
tied to an international competitiveness agenda, which re-
quired ameliorating but also containing informality.
Achieving effectiveness. All PRIMED interventions 
“aimed at improvements in economic conditions and 
quality of life with long-term social impacts” (Betancur, 
2007, 5-6).  Moreover, PRIMED actively sought to fight 
“the loss of governmental legitimacy” (PRIMED, 1996, 
42) precipitated by “the extremes of paternalism, political 
patronage/clientelism, favoritism, and isolated or crisis in-
terventions….It assumed an apolitical form of intervention 
based on high levels of professionalism and efficiency.  It 
operated on the basis of a carefully designed plan and 
criteria for each of its components” (Betancur, 2007, 4).
In 1999, PRIMED conducted a random survey of 300 
participant households.  Results were “likely skewed” as 
two-thirds of respondents had received home improve-
ments, and no baseline survey was conducted (Betancur, 
2007, 10).  Nonetheless, “ninety-six percent of respon-
dents indicated that their quality of life had improved.  The 
highest levels of satisfaction came from home improve-
ments (66%), public spaces (49%), and legalization of 
tenure (36%)….In fact, PRIMED had the highest credibility 
among government entities at 48%, followed by the utility 
company (14%)” (ibid.).  
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Researchers, however, offer a more critical account. 
First, Andrew Nickson argues that major political reforms 
in Latin America “did not bring about any reform of mu-
nicipal management style,” and municipal administrators 
remained ill-equipped to implement the decentralization 
agenda (Nickson, 1995, 154).  PRIMED acknowledged 
that delays in project execution made it “typical to listen 
to sentences like: ‘PRIMED is one more program of the 
Administration; it is only promises’” (PRIMED, 1996, 80). 
Second, though PRIMED established contact with local 
armed groups at each site (ibid., 65), resistance, brib-
ery demands, and renegotiations when militia leadership 
changed stymied implementation (Betancur, 2007, 7). 
PRIMED’s office in the Central-Western Zone (Zona Cen-
tro Occidental) was also caught in violent crossfire in May 
1994, leading “many of the officials” to seek psychologi-
cal support (PRIMED, 1996, 93).
Third, PRIMED did not offer job training, employment op-
portunities with PRIMED were temporary, and skills ac-
quired did not aid in securing full-time positions (Betan-
cur, 2007, 10).  Finally, PRIMED’s efforts were constrained 
by technological challenges, incomplete information and 
the difficulties of coordinating with local organizations 
(PRIMED, 1996, 98).  Though UN-HABITAT would list 
PRIMED as an urban development “best practice” in 
1996 (Blanco and Kobayashi, 2009, 81), PRIMED is, ulti-
mately, faulted for its overly ambitious agenda and rather 
ineffective implementation (Betancur, 2007, 8).
Enabling agency. The municipality acknowledged 
outright that a “divorce between the civil society and the 
public administration had been generating for a long time, 
due to the absence of adequate…mechanisms that could 
allow the community and civic participation” (PRIMED, 
1996, 39).  To its credit, PRIMED:
“wanted community involvement all the way 
from determination of needs and establish-
ment of priorities to implementation and main-
tenance.  The agency was convinced that if 
the community did not gain ownership, the 
program could not achieve its intended and 
more intangible goals…namely, the effec-
tive insertion of the area into the city, trust in 
government, its institutions, and the rule of 
law, and continuation of the work” (Betancur, 
2007, 5).
Community participation was, thus, closely aligned with 
PRIMED’s broader goals of efficiency, efficacy and demo-
cratic legitimacy.  PRIMED set up offices near the sites of 
intervention and were in regular contact with local lead-
ers through five sector-based community committees per 
zone of intervention (PRIMED, 1996, 65 and 116).  
Despite these efforts, however, the practice of participa-
tion proved deficient.  While the communities were in-
volved in “those aspects of the implementation in which 
local consent was required,” they were generally “absent 
from the initial planning and decision-making process” 
(Betancur, 2007, 9).  PRIMED objectives were “heavily 
biased toward the priorities and agendas of government” 
(ibid.), and from the outset, other local needs (predomi-
nantly non-infrastructural) were “discarded” as “out of the 
program possibility” (PRIMED, 1996, 109).  In attempt to 
reasonably manage expectations, PRIMED “appeared 
before the community with concrete proposals that” 
PRIMED had independently determined “corresponded 
to real sector problems” (ibid.).  As a result, community 
participation took on a passive and consultative, rather 
than collaborative function. 
Moreover, due to immature local organization and limited 
capacity-building efforts, only 18 “collective initiative proj-
ects” were funded while PRIMED had the funds to support 
240 (Betancur, 2008, 8-9).  PRIMED did not effectively 
spur longer-term social organization as it had intended; 
community committees shut down once PRIMED imple-
mentation was complete.  While PRIMED acknowledged 
some of these shortcomings and had established work-
shops to aid in community capacity building, the program 
did not survive to see those efforts tested (ibid.).
Embedding interdependence. PRIMED acknowl-
edged openly that for success, “traditional jealousy and 
antipathy” would have to be overcome, and “a participa-
tive style of management [would have] to be developed 
on the basis of a continuous flow of information and an 
intense communication” (PRIMED, 1996, 50 and 52). 
Though PRIMED was administered under the Housing 
and Social Development Corporation of Medellín and 
was accountable to the Mayor, it operated through an 
independent structure.  As such, it maintained a reputa-
tion free of clientelism and “attract[ed] an array social 
forces (e.g. the Catholic Church, philanthropic entities, 
institutes and universities) that had been traditionally 
alienated by the politically charged and self-interested 
parties commonly involved in this type of work” (Betan-
cur, 2007, 4-5).  
In theory, PRIMED served a coordinating and oversight 
role, bringing together the activities and resources of 
other government agencies, NGOs and subcontrac-
tors.  Yet, PRIMED lacked the capacity to coordinate 
the “complexity of an approach with so many partners 
and elements,” particularly as it worked around prior 
patronage-based agreements that had been negotiat-
ed in the communities (Betancur, 2007, 7).  Coordinat-
ing committees were overstaffed and responsibilities 
were not clearly delineated (ibid., 8).  With delays and 
inefficiencies in project management, PRIMED strug-
gled to maintain community support (PRIMED, 1996, 
97).   
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Furthermore, PRIMED’s independent administrative 
structure conferred a political isolation that would, ulti-
mately, impede its longevity.  PRIMED “was not properly 
inserted into the general agenda of the municipality….
As such, it did not enter the organic municipal structure 
guaranteeing its full inclusion in the general plan for the 
city” (Betancur, 2007, 8).  The program faced its demise 
in 2000 both because “traditional representative and 
technocratic planning mechanisms” resisted and re-
sented its innovative approach (Calderon, 2008, 61) and 
because the program’s placement within the municipal 
bureaucracy ensured that only “limited electoral capital…
could be derived from…[its] isolationist culture” (Betan-
cur, 2007, 11).  PRIMED “never entered the political ide-
als and agendas of the moment” (Calderon, 2008, 57; 
Blanco and Kobayashi, 2009).  When PRIMED was ter-
minated, the Medellín establishment lost a hard-earned 
“trust in the capacity and legitimacy of administrative in-
stitutions” (Calderon, 2008, 62), which only years earlier, 
PRIMED had claimed was its “greatest program achieve-
ment” (PRIMED, 1996, 104).  
3.4. Period Three: Governance Renown 
(Social Urbanism)
At the end of PRIMED, Medellín still faced “high levels of 
poverty, poorly coordinated state interventions, a deficit 
of public spaces, insufficient housing and a deteriorating 
natural environment” (Calderon, 2008, 54).  In 2004, Me-
dellín had COL$7 billion to pay obligations of COL$84.4 
billion (Devlin, 2010, 8).  Violence had precipitated mas-
sive capital flight; 1.9 million Colombians emigrated be-
tween 1996 and 2005 and almost US$10 billion left the 
country between 1998 and 2003 (Rettberg, 2007, 484). 
Critics also feared that Mayor Luis Pérez (2001-2003) 
was “adverse to participatory and democratic processes” 
(Carvajal, 2011, 2-5).  
“Things began to change with the election of Álvaro Uribe 
as president of Colombia in 2002….Uribe dramatically 
expanded Colombia’s military and national police and 
launched an all-out offensive” against paramilitaries, ulti-
mately, negotiating a pacification strategy (Fukuyama and 
Colby, 2011).  For Medellín, the turning point came when 
Sergio Fajardo, “a mayor of a distinct political class,” was 
elected to serve from 2004-2007 (Carvajal, 2011, 2-5). 
Fajardo represented a unique blend of populism and es-
tablishment, building a reputation for empathy toward the 
poor while retaining links to influential business interests 
through his personal networks (Devlin, 2010, 2).  Fajardo 
was elected with more votes than any mayoral candidate 
in Medellín’s history (ibid.).
In the early 1990s, Fajardo had brought together “fed-up 
N
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Figure 3.5. Medellín Human Development Index. Source: Echeverri, 2008.
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members of the city’s community organizations and reli-
gious, academic, and business institutions…to discuss 
ideas to fix their embattled city” (Fukuyama and Colby, 
2011).  Those conversations identified twin challenges in 
Medellín: “profound social inequalities and historically-ac-
cumulated debts [to the poor], and deep-rooted violence” 
(Echeverri, 2008).  From that analysis, a “social move-
ment came to life” (Alonso Salazar, quoted in Fukuyama 
and Colby, 2011), and with the Fajardo’s election more 
than a decade later came “a political revolution…to turn 
the ideas into a real-world policy agenda” (Fukuyama 
and Colby, 2011).  Fajardo called for “social urbanism,” 
a governance framework that channeled “great invest-
ments in urban projects” to the areas with the city’s 
lowest Human Development Index scores (Figures 3.5 
and 3.6) (Brand, 2010).  Social urbanism scaled up and 
redirected PRIMED’s prescription.  An integrated sys-
tem of civic infrastructure, social housing, transportation 
projects and economic development became the “flag-
ships” of broader transformation (Echeverri, 2008) that, 
unlike PRIMED, did not only address functional need, 
but also promoted high-visibility “spaces of citizen-
ship, democracy and co-existence” (Medellín, quoted in 
Brand, 2010). 
“Diligently executed,” these Integral Urban Projects 
(Proyectos Urbanos Integrales, or PUIs) are carried out 
in five phases—Diagnosis, Planning, Design, Implemen-
tation, and Animation—and each has social, institutional 
and physical objectives (Calderon, 2008; Medellín, n.d.). 
Social objectives focus on community participation, or-
ganization and leadership (Medellín, n.d.).  Institutional 
objectives call for “coordinated action among all munici-
pal actors” and promote “alliances with the private sec-
tor, NGOs, national and international organizations and 
community-based organizations” (ibid.).  Physical objec-
tives prioritize time management and quality (ibid.).  On 
paper, social urbanism is exemplar of the governance 
discourse.
Distributing rules and resources. Social urbanism 
continues PRIMED’s progressive transformation of the 
rules that structure Medellín.  Its aspirations to improve 
Figure 3.6. PUI intervention zones. Source: Echeverri, 2008.
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“quality of life” are articulated in terms of “pride and self-
esteem” and ensuring the poor “feel integrated in the 
development of the city” (Echeverri, 2009, 2).  Critically, 
municipal resources bolster these rules.  “Total spend-
ing by Medellín’s city government doubled between 2004 
and 2008” due, in large part, to revenues from “a high 
municipal tax rate that is tolerated by a uniquely civic-
minded business elite” (Fukuyama and Colby, 2011) and 
from Empresas Públicas de Medellín, the public utility 
provider mandated to give 30 percent of its net profit to 
the city (Brand, 2010; Brand and Dávila, 2011; Bateman, 
et al., 2011).  Participatory budgeting, furthermore, grants 
citizen authority over five percent of the municipal budget 
(Schmidt, 2011) 3. 
Library-Parks.  Between 2004 and 2007, Medellín con-
structed 1.3 times more public space than had been built 
in the 53 years prior, including 20 new parks (Calderon, 
2008, 83).  Architectural competitions were held to de-
sign high-profile library-park and secondary school com-
plexes, “buildings which, for their scale, form, materials 
and colors, contrast strongly with their surroundings, and 
clearly announce that the local administration is providing 
facilities, worthy of envy even in the wealthy areas of the 
city” (Brand, 2010).  Furthermore, library-parks enter into 
local life through community and cultural activities, such 
as reading and computer literacy programs (McDermott, 
2010).  
Metrocable. Under Fajardo’s predecessor, Luis Pérez, 
Medellín also innovatively installed cable cars associat-
ed with ski slopes for transit to and from mountainside 
settlements.  Constructed with local labor, the “Metro-
cable” transports 67,000 people daily (Blanco and Ko-
bayashi, 2009, 85).  Public space improvements, housing 
upgrades and environmental risk management flank the 
Metrocable, sowing more holistic urban renewal.  In fact, 
“the value of public investment in complementary urban 
upgrading projects exceeded by a factor of six the cost 
of building the cable-car system itself” (Brand and Dávila, 
2011, 18).  Three bridges have also been constructed to 
connect districts across Medellín’s mountainsides.  The 
spectacular imagery of the these interventions has trans-
formed how “a critical area of the city was perceived by 
insiders and outsiders…leading to relevant social, socio-
spatial and socio-economic revitalization, while promot-
ing inclusive patterns of urbanization” (Blanco and Ko-
bayashi, 2009, 76).
Microenterprise.  PUIs are also associated with Cultura E, 
a program to enhance local entrepreneurialism.  Fourteen 
business development centers (Centros de Desarrollo 
Empresarial Zonal, or CEDEZOs) have been established 
in the poorest neighborhoods; a microfinance institution 
(Banco de las Oportunidades) has offered over 50,000 
loans in eight years to microenterprises (Beszterczey and 
O’Neil, 2011); and business leaders have established the 
consortium Pro-Antioquia to promote economic growth 
by harnessing local production for their supply chains 
(Bateman, et al., 2011).  
Despite remarkable redistributive potential, concerns are 
emerging over awareness of library-
park programming and their accessibility due to distance 
from residential zones (McDermott, 2010).  Similarly, the 
Metrocable prohibits carrying large loads, which diminish-
es its utility for informal vendors.  In fact, less than ten per-
cent of public transport journeys in the areas surrounding 
Metrocable stations utilize the Metrocable/Metro combi-
nation (Brand and Dávila, 2011, 8 and 13).  Finally, it is 
unclear the extent to which microenterprise is generating 
growth or “recycling poverty” by not strengthening con-
sumer demand or building more sustainable small- and 
medium-enterprises (Bateman, et al., 2011, 3).  
Enabling agency. Building on 1980s and 1990s policy 
changes, Fajardo’s election signaled that “public partici-
pation in Medellín was no longer considered as a threat 
but rather as a mean (sic) to legitimize a new democratic 
model” (Calderon, 2008, 62).  Participatory processes in 
social urbanism “recognize cultural, demographic, territo-
rial and ethnic diversity” and have contributed to “matura-
tion of local citizenship” (Carvajal, 2011, 9). 
The Diagnosis stage involves a survey of community or-
ganizations on-site, and community input on analyses of 
the existing urban fabric.  A “Workshop for Urban Imagin-
ing” (Taller de Imaginarios Urbanos) also solicits commu-
nity members’ ideas to help shape interventions (Calde-
ron, 2008, 76-77).  Like PRIMED, community committees 
are then established during Planning.  Official PUI teams 
are “constantly in contact” with these committees, and 
“some [PUI team] members are located directly in the area 
of intervention” (Calderon, 2008, 68).  As with PRIMED, 
however, PUI programs are strongly biased toward physi-
cal developments; “(though highly participatory), the PUI 
Team comes already with predetermined plans and proj-
ects” (ibid., 99).  By consequence, community visions for 
non-infrastructural interventions are overlooked, lead-
ing to a Planning stage that is more “consultative” than 
“shared control” (ibid., 100).  
During the Design phase, a second series of “Work-
shops for Imagining Projects” (Talleres de Imaginarios 
Por Proyecto) ask community members to envision 
ideal designs for projects that have passed the Plan-
ning stage.  Responses to questions like: “What does 
this place mean to me?” “Which memories does this 
place bring to me?” and “What would I like [it] to have?” 
are molded into actionable strategies for community 
approval and, thereby, provide “shared control” over 
decision-making (Calderon, 2008, 99 and 101).  Com-
munities are then involved in Implementation through 
employment, and in Animation as they take symbolic 
ownership of completed projects through community 
events.  
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Unlike PRIMED, these engagements have catalyzed 
deeper community organization for commerce, local 
tourism, and infrastructure maintenance (Calderon, 
2008, 84).  The municipality has signed “civic pacts” 
with communities, not only outlining post-construction 
responsibility sharing, but also helping communities to 
“develop an awareness of what they could contribute 
to collective endeavors, no matter how humble their 
means, and, perhaps more importantly, a sense of what 
they were entitled to expect from the government” (Dev-
lin, 2010, 7).  Criticisms of agency enablement in social 
urbanism—that power struggles “cannot be shaken by 
participation, but are rather reflected and replicated di-
rectly in it” (Carvajal, 2011, 5-7)—are characteristic of 
those launched against participation processes more 
generally.
Embedding interdependence. Social urbanism has 
benefited greatly from the history of PRIMED.  Indeed, 
actors who participated in PRIMED have helped execute 
social urbanism programs, thereby allowing for “the PUI 
Model to build on a process that in spite of its shortcom-
ings had already mobilized part of the community and 
created the beginnings of the mainstream of acting on 
slum areas” (Calderon, 2008, 91).  Furthermore, PRIMED 
taught that a lack of interdependence would hinder pro-
gram longevity.  Fajardo’s tactics demonstrate his aware-
ness of this point: for more than a decade, he established 
“an unorthodox coalition of business people, grassroots 
community organizers, and the middle class” to sign on 
to his “radical political agenda,” (Fukuyama and Colby, 
2011; Brand and Dávila, 2011).  
As mayor, Fajardo bred interdependence by example, 
prizing transparency, co-responsibility and open commu-
nication.  He appeared regularly on radio, in print, and on 
television to answer constituent questions.  Indeed, “[p]
eople had the perception that Fajardo was in the street 
every day,” prepared to work collaboratively with Medel-
linenses to tackle the city’s challenges (Devlin, 2010, 7). 
By consequence, a candidate from the social urbanism 
movement was elected to succeed Fajardo; “[t]hat two 
mayors with the same roots succeed each other in office 
had never happened before” (Sergio Fajardo, quoted in 
Dávila, 2009, 53).
PUIs also clearly define roles for each actor.  Again learn-
ing from PRIMED, PUIs are integrated into the city’s de-
velopment plans, such that their success is considered 
“strategic for achieving the development of Medellín” as a 
whole (Calderon, 2008, 92).  Although raising questions 
as to whether PUIs are collaborative or simply coordinat-
ed, PUI teams maintain databases of planned projects 
across all public agencies and seek to link them as appro-
priate (ibid., 95).  Funding for PUI interventions has also 
come, in large part, from Empresas Públicas de Medel-
lín, a uniquely interdependent institution in its own right 
(Brand, 2010; Brand and Dávila, 2011; Bateman, et al., 
2011).
Finally, in another departure from PRIMED, social urban-
ism projects aim to create high-visibility community spac-
es and are less oriented toward small-scale infrastructural 
improvements.  Library-parks seek to provide functional 
learning environments, but also spaces of gathering 
(Calderon, 2008, 76).  Similarly, the Metrocable provides 
conveyance for mountainside settlements, and yet has 
also promoted local tourism, bringing Medellinenses to 
parts of the city they had never seen (Brand, 2010).
 
Achieving effectiveness. Owing to demobilization 
negotiated by the Colombian state, during Fajardo’s 
term “the paramilitaries largely…refrained from overt vio-
lence….Fajardo’s timing was fortuitous” (Devlin, 2010, 2). 
Nonetheless, Fajardo’s effective capitalization of those 
opportune years deserves much credit.  Not seeking 
membership in a major political party and still winning 
election in a landslide gave Fajardo unprecedented cred-
ibility 4.  He steadfastly opposed clientelism, and “for the 
first time, councilmen had to seriously consider the con-
sequences of opposing a popular mayor” (ibid., 4).  Fa-
jardo “budget[ed] based on results,” and his ethical man-
agement had broader impact.  Over his term, industrial 
and commercial tax filings increased by nearly 45 percent 
(ibid., 8).  
Though Fajardo did not tackle corruption in the police or 
lower levels of government (Devlin, 2010, 10), PUIs have 
been lauded for effective management and financing.  The 
Urban Development Corporation (Empresa de Desarrollo 
Urbano), which implements PUIs, “brings together tested 
techniques, young professionals and academics…a for-
tuitous combination that allows for new ideas to be imple-
mented in very short time frames” (Brand, 2010).  Though 
keystone projects are relatively inexpensive (library-parks 
cost US$6 million, and the Metrocable US$25 million per 
line), PUIs have been paid for almost entirely through the 
city’s capital funds, not new borrowing or external dona-
tions (ibid.).  Unlike PRIMED, continuity of funding and ef-
ficient approvals have reinstated trust in the state (Blanco 
and Kobayashi, 2009, 88).
Yet, an unnerving concern is emerging.  Current May-
or Alonso Salazar’s (2008-2011) slogan for the city is 
“Medellín: Supportive and Competitive,” in contrast to 
Fajardo’s “Medellín: The Most Educated” (Brand, 2010; 
Echeverri, 2008).  Salazar’s lexicon “juggles two fairly 
incompatible logics” (Brand, 2010), reflecting demands 
that mayors achieve both socio-political objectives, while 
also enhancing their cities’ competitiveness (Dávila, 
2009; Dávila, 2011).  While high-visibility projects meant 
that “for the first time, the people of Medellín ‘actually 
saw things happening’” (Devlin, 2010, 7), “the aesthetic 
impact” can also be employed “to promote an economi-
cally competitive and socially progressive image” (Brand 
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and Dávila, 2011, 16, emph. original).  Concerns surfac-
ing over: inaccessibility of the library-parks (McDermott, 
2010); limited economic impact of microenterprise (Bate-
man, et al., 2011); the Metrocable’s negligible impact 
on mobility, economic activity or land values (Brand and 
Dávila, 2011); and the sheer lack of outcome assessment 
(Devlin, 2010) do not inherently cast doubt on the motiva-
tions behind social urbanism.  They do, however, highlight 
the competing objectives at play—delivering high-visibility 
versus high-impact urban interventions.  The international 
attention that social urbanism has garnered threatens to 
obscure improvements that remain to be made. 
1. Despite the Constitution’s democratization focus, legislators 
bowed to Pablo Escobar and included non-extradition as a fun-
damental right (Lamb, 2010, 61).  The non-extradition clause 
was repealed in 1996 (ibid., 129). 
2. Medellín also implemented participatory budgeting from 
1997-2000 (Urán, 2004, 2) and again beginning in 2004.  Me-
dellín is one of the world’s largest cities with a participatory 
budgeting scheme; it currently accounts for five percent of the 
municipal budget (Devlin, 2010; Schmidt, 2011). 
3. See Footnote 10. 
4. In July 2010, Fajardo joined the Green Party (León, 2010).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
4. Conclusions: prospects for Medellín & Social Urbanism
4.1. Distinct governance experiences
Each of three periods in Medellín’s recent history repre-
sents a distinct governance experience.  Historical cir-
cumstances, and resulting interplays of structure and 
agency, produced in each era a particular blend of ef-
fectiveness, agency, rules and resource distribution, and 
interdependence, and consequently, disparate success 
in addressing the city’s historic poverty and inequality.
Illicit Governance: Stagnation and Survival. At 
mid-century, the city was unprepared for extensive in-mi-
gration and unable to meet housing and economic needs. 
Violence destabilized Medellín, which was governed by 
the illicit rationality of narcotraffickers, paramilitaries and 
guerrillas.  The hegemony of armed agents created pow-
erful structures of domination, in which ordinary citizens’ 
actions were reduced to survivalism.  Some forms of so-
cial organization took root, but did so without meaningful 
voice or legitimation in a weak and clientelistic political 
system.  With the state bargaining with thugs, drug lords 
relying on mercurial loyalties, and narcotraffickers buying 
community allegiance through resource distribution, the 
prospects of genuine interdependence or a change in the 
city’s treatment of the poor appeared distant.  
Although innate, agencies “vary dramatically from one so-
cial world to another depending on the nature of the par-
ticular structures that inform those social worlds” (Sewell, 
1992, 20-21).  The extreme realities of this “positioning” 
are evident in this period of Medellín’s history.  Medellín’s 
negative stalemate defied the potential of structures to 
be recursively organized.  Indeed, the actions of people 
overwhelmed by the threat of violence served largely to 
instantiate that hegemony and reinforce the structures 
that dominated their daily lives.      
PRIMED: Aspiration versus Achievements. By the 
mid-1990s, structures of legitimation—laws and norms—
were changing in Medellín as decentralization policies 
and a new constitution strengthened local agency and 
participatory democracy.  PRIMED was a manifestation of 
the era’s optimism, as well as inexperience, in good gov-
ernance.  Though biased toward the resource improve-
ments officials desired, PRIMED effectively revitalized part 
of the urban infrastructure.  Street and housing upgrades 
were not, however, linked to administrative overhauls. 
PRIMED ineffectively managed its partnerships, offered 
tokenistic opportunities for community agency and failed 
to coalesce diverse political interests around its progres-
sive objectives.
The era proved to be a moment of transition for Medellín, 
one in which a belief that structures could be recursively 
organized was rekindled.  Yet, “agency is not intentions, 
but capacities” (Giddens, 1984, 9).  Without fully ad-
dressing ongoing violence; without widespread civic par-
ticipation or long-term social organization; without safe-
guarding legal changes with authoritative resources; and 
without embedding interdependence through its ideals, 
PRIMED could not effect lasting changes and was aban-
doned.  PRIMED’s ultimate contribution, therefore, was 
to inspire a shift in structures of signification and legitima-
tion; empathetic modes of discourse and laws emerged 
to challenge exclusion and confront the illegitimacy of a 
culture of inefficiency, corruption and violence. 
Social Urbanism: Achievement versus Acknowl-
edment. Violence subsided during Mayor Fajardo’s term, 
and through his progressive leadership, the city under-
went a “rebirth [that] is nothing short of astonishing” (Fu-
kuyama and Colby, 2011).  More than a decade of intel-
lectual formation—no doubt informed by the aspirations 
and shortcomings of PRIMED—unleashed social urban-
ism.  Shared ideals on the objective of and mechanisms 
for poverty alleviation were the basis of good governance. 
Though projects were implicitly linked to the interests of 
the city’s managerial class, Mayors Fajardo and Salazar 
have actualized their commitment to effective manage-
ment, political devolution and agency enablement. 
Social urbanism is, in some ways, validation of struc-
turation theory.  Social urbanism represents the fruition 
of the city’s rekindled faith in the recursive organization 
of structures—that structures can, indeed, be changed. 
Medellín’s leadership, furthermore, believed that they, as 
political agents, could enact those changes; by building a 
progressive discourse, they could instantiate new struc-
tures of signification, domination and legitimation.  Finally, 
attaching both authoritative and allocative resources to 
their progressive visions allowed for structural changes 
that are producing meaningful impacts in the lives of the 
urban poor. 
What remains to be seen, however, is: the extent to which 
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social urbanism is packaged for captive audiences without 
reference to context; the manner in which social urban-
ism is executed moving forward, as Medellín capitalizes 
on a boost in its international brand; and, by contrast, the 
extent to which Medellín allows social urbanism to evolve 
to continue addressing its poverty.  Social urbanism is ap-
proaching maturity—and receiving attention comparable 
to PRIMED in 1996.  The city’s decisions now will deter-
mine whether, unlike PRIMED, this era meets its potential. 
4.2. Lessons from a Broader Perspective
Viewing the three eras from a wider historical perspec-
tive provides additional, broader insights into the nature 
of governance success and Margaret Archer’s question 
on when structural properties “throw their weight” behind 
constitution or reconstitution of society (1990, 83).  Three 
overarching conclusions emerge: the state is a critical 
player, interdependence is a critical component and time 
is a critical factor for achieving good governance.  
First, the state has, undeniably, been the principal player 
in Medellín’s remarkable transformation.  Under the nar-
cotrafficking hegemony, emboldened by neoliberal cut-
backs of state authority, Medellín demonstrated that “[w]
hen the state exits the stage, so do responsive government 
and democracy” (Pierre and Peters, 2000, 13).  A weak 
state neither addressed the needs of its expanding urban 
population, nor pursued reforms to strengthen agency. 
PRIMED demonstrates, however, that state effectiveness 
“is often the outcome of the tug-of-war between the role 
the state wants to play and the role which the external 
environment allows it to play” (ibid., 26).  Though demo-
cratic ideals emerged in PRIMED, clientelism and political 
inefficiencies constrained the program’s potential.  Social 
urbanism was developed through intellectual partner-
ships outside the state.  However, those intellectuals’ as-
cension to the mayor’s office—where they commanded 
political capital, authority and municipal finances—moved 
social urbanism from philosophy to practice.  
Erik Swyngedouw has raised important criticisms of gov-
ernance theory, particularly questioning how representa-
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tiveness, legitimacy and accountability are assured when 
the state devolves responsibility (2005).  Medellín demon-
strates, however, that state leadership need not be lost 
in the practice of governance, but rather a decentralized, 
participatory and effectively managed state is capable 
of upholding democratic principles through governance. 
The state is neither always powerful nor always the arbiter 
of good governance.  Indeed, much of why social urban-
ism has succeeded is that its leaders injected new life into 
a weak and unresponsive state.  Nonetheless, progres-
sive change—certainly of the magnitude that has been 
seen in Medellín—necessitates that the state be actively 
engaged in, if not leading, the effort.   
Second, Medellín’s trajectory highlights that interdepen-
dence is a critical component for achieving good gover-
nance.  While efficiency, agency and rule and resource 
distribution are, undoubtedly, important means and out-
comes, the level of interdependence fostered strongly 
influences the strength of partnerships, the longevity of 
good governance practice and the durability of its impact 
in those other realms.  Narcotraffickers battled distrust, 
and PRIMED struggled against political torpor.  Social 
urbanism has succeeded, by contrast, in large part, be-
cause it was implemented not just through policy, but 
through a political movement.  Sergio Fajardo left office 
with a near-90 percent approval rating (Devlin, 2010, 1), 
having “managed to elicit a conceptual mental change” 
in Medellín (Sergio Fajardo, quoted in Dávila, 2009, 53).  
The four analytical drivers of good governance do, how-
ever, feed upon one another.  Interdependence seeks to 
build trust and collaboration, including with ordinary citi-
zens.  Genuine participation and rule and resource dis-
tribution strengthen interdependence, by instilling faith 
in the political process.  Effective interventions, particu-
larly those derived from people’s agency, similarly build 
trust.  Good governance, in other words, breeds good 
governance by setting in motion progressive practices 
and confidence that rhetoric is backed with meaningful 
action.  
Finally, Medellín’s long, sometimes lethargic, transfor-
mation is evidence that time is a critical factor in achiev-
ing good governance.  Part of why PRIMED failed was 
that, following decades of survivalist lifestyles, commu-
nity agency simply had not matured.  With time, citi-
zenship capacities have grown, and, by consequence, 
social urbanism shows far greater potential for lasting 
change than its antecedent.  The same can be said of 
the city’s capacity to deal with violence. Current escala-
tions aside, with time, the city experimented, failed and 
grew an understanding of how best to deal with and 
reintegrate insurgent actors.  Suggesting that time is 
necessary is not advocating for complacency.  Rather, 
the city’s long-term struggle has built a transformation 
that, quite simply, could not have been achieved in a 
matter of months.
Time also offers the city a repository of perspective.  The 
historical realities of narcotrafficking hegemony are still 
present in the city’s psyche and influence how people in-
teract and how social urbanism leaders conduct their af-
fairs.  In a 2008 campaign by the Love for Medellín Foun-
dation (Fundación Amor Por Medellín), a man sings, “The 
place where I was born, and where I grew up with friends. 
The city for my children, where I live and work.  Medel-
lín, I grew with you.  Your progress is for all” (Fundación 
Amor Por Medellín, 2008).  The sense of history, of shared 
growth, serves as a rallying call for Medellinenses to re-
sist abandoning what has been built.  With the benefit 
of hindsight, the current challenge is to anticipate future 
shortcomings and begin addressing them in their infancy.
4.3. Prospects for Medellín and Social 
Urbanism
Medellín is “one of those cities that…leaped from infancy 
to decadence without ever having gone through maturity” 
(Melguizo and Cronshaw, 2001, 113).  While Medellín’s 
historical prominence gives the city a culture of confi-
dence, it has had to link its relatively immature capacities 
to its bold aspirations.  From what is already understood 
of the philosophy and practice of social urbanism, at least 
five strategies for improvement are clear:
First, for social urbanism to effectively represent needs, it 
must expand from its initial mandate for high-profile infra-
structure to all manner of projects that can effect positive 
change in the lives of the urban poor.  If participatory pro-
cesses result in communities envisioning improved health 
facilities, for example, then social urbanism must be able 
to channel city resources to those ends, without relying 
exclusively on participatory budgeting.  Expanding the 
remit of social urbanism can also serve as an essential 
check on those who may seek to capitalize on its visibility 
for city marketing ends.  
Second, and closely related, social urbanism must con-
tinue growing its community engagement and participa-
tory design practices.  The imagining workshops are an 
instrumental mechanism to ensure agency, accountabil-
ity and effectiveness.  That participation in the planning 
stage is seen as “consultative” rather than as “shared 
control” offers an obvious area for improvement.
Third, though social urbanism has instilled profound inter-
dependence around political narratives, it must continue 
to grow its private sector collaborations.  The Overseas 
Development Institute rightly highlights the need for stron-
ger consumer demand and greater support for Cultura E 
to generate more sustainable economic impacts (Bate-
man, et al., 2011). 
Fourth, social urbanism owes its success, in part, to a 
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containment of violence between 2002 and 2007.  Since 
then, however, violence has escalated, and Medellín is 
again the fourth most violent city in the world (Corrales, 
2010).  Though homicides are still far below their 1991 
high, current violence has diminished the use of public 
space, debilitated the social fabric and jeopardized com-
munity organization (Convivamos, 2010).  Yet, the nation-
al and local states’ responses have been “erratic” (Cor-
rales, 2010).  Both the physical security of Medellinenses 
and the hard-earned social and political improvements of 
social urbanism depend on a more concerted re-engage-
ment by state authorities.
Finally, social urbanism began as an “intellectual proj-
ect” (Sergio Fajardo, quoted in Dávila, 2009, 49).  The 
intellectual exploration that initiated this transformation 
should not be lost as the movement reaches maturity. 
Social urbanists must continue to explore potential for 
new interventions and new partnerships in poor com-
munities while building on the successes of those al-
ready implemented.  Furthermore, with seven years of 
practice behind it, research is desperately needed on 
social urbanism’s wider impacts.  How has housing in-
frastructure improved health and safety?  How has civic 
infrastructure improved learning?  How has transpor-
tation infrastructure improved economic opportunity? 
These analyses should be carried out with sensitivity to 
the diversity of the city’s inhabitants, studying impacts 
on women and men, the elderly and young, the native 
and the migrant.  Whether Medellín can finally close its 
chapters of illicit and unsuccessfully aspirational gover-
nance depends on these findings.  
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